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Abstract
Managers’ unintentional or intentional bad accounting 
behaviors will result in poor quality of accounting 
information of listed companies, making a great extent to 
interfere with investors, causing confusion in the capital 
market, is not conducive to reflect the performance 
management responsibility. Research on Managers bad 
accounting behaviors of listed companies is of great 
significance to improve management, optimize the 
allocation of social resources. This paper respectively 
discusses the manifestation and the causes both of 
managers’ unintentional and intentional bad accounting 
behaviors. It also puts forward recommendations to 
prevent managers’ bad accounting behaviors of listed 
companies in China, so as to  safeguard the interests of 
stakeholders and provide good environment for capital 
market by  improving the efficiency and accounting 
information quality of listed companies.
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INTRODUCTION
Accounting behaviors refer to the course of conduct 
highly relevant to accounting information generation, 
processing and transmission. Accounting behaviors have a 
significant impact on budgeting, performance evaluation, 
cost control and decision-making (Hopwood, 1974). From 
the micro view, accounting behaviors include accounting 
organization, business accounting, and internal accounting 
controls. In the accounting process, managers who master 
business decision-making power and control are important 
participants in accounting policy choices, decision-making 
of significant accounting issues, etc. Thus the quality 
of accounting information of listed companies depends 
largely on the managers’ behavior. We call the managers’ 
actions and manifestations involved in corporate 
accounting practices as managers accounting behaviors. 
Managers are usually referred to the human capital 
owners who join in a business contracts with their 
management talent and really own the residual rights 
of control (XIE, 2005). Managers are responsible for 
determining organizational goals, formulate strategies 
to achieve stated objectives, monitor and explain the 
external environmental condition, and make decisions on 
issues affecting the entire organization. General speaking, 
managers of Chinese listed companies cover president, 
vice president, department managers, chief financial 
officer, chief engineer and so on. 
The result of accounting behaviors is to produce 
accounting information, thus accounting practices and 
accounting information has a direct causal relationship. 
Standard accounting practices provide true and full 
accounting information and meet various needs. Non-
standard accounting behaviors will produce false, 
incomplete accounting information, which ultimately 
disturbs or even misleads those in need of accounting 
information to use. Such irregularities may be due to two 
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aspects, one is deviations from accounting objectives 
or losing the objectives because of people’s bounded 
rationality, which is summarized as non-subjective bad 
accounting (ZHANG, 2005). The other is negative affect 
on accounting information generation and disclosure for 
certain bad intent or purpose, which accordingly may 
be called intentional bad accounting. So, management 
accounting practices can also be divided into two 
categories: one is the management non-subjective 
bad accounting behaviors, the managers involved in 
the process of accounting practices have not any bad 
intentions but are constrained by bounded rationality, 
which lead to low quality of accounting information, it 
is not malicious, and thus may be called the managers 
unintentional bad accounting behaviors; the other is 
manager intentional bad accounting behaviors, which 
means the manager’s participate accounting practices just 
for their own interests or certain bad purpose. An analysis 
shows that management is the most fundamental body of 
financial reporting fraud, and is the real source of financial 
reporting fraud (CHEN, 2009). 
This paper discusses the specific manifestations of 
managers’ unintentional and intentional bad accounting 
behaviors respectively, analyzes their causes and proposes 
recommendations against these two types of managers’ 
bad accounting behaviors of listed companies in China, 
which is to promote listed companies to improve 
management level and accounting information quality. 
1.  THE MANIFESTATION AND CAUSES 
OF MANAGERS’ UNINTENTIONAL BAD 
ACCOUNTING BEHAVIORS IN CHINA’S 
LISTED COMPANIES
1.1  The Manifestation of Managers’ Unintentional 
Bad Accounting Behaviors 
The performance of manager ’ unintentional bad 
accounting can be divided into the following three 
aspects:
First, the accounting organization is less rigorous. 
Accounting organization is the basis of accounting. 
From the micro view, it mainly covers the development 
and implementation of enterprise accounting system, 
setting up accounting body, arrangement of accounting 
personnel and selecting accounting methods, which is 
to ensure the rational and effective for accounting work. 
But in fact some listed companies’ accounting basic work 
has weak links, the most prominent are: the quality of 
some company’s accounting staff is not high, resulting in 
accounting arbitrary, unclear procedures, serious errors, 
accounting data missing; some company’s accounting staff 
is not equipped well, accounting methods are not suitable 
for the unit, making accounting disorder and inefficient.
Second, the accounting process is less standardized. 
Mainly include: managers' unintentional choices of 
accounting policies are not applicable, resulting in 
accounting information has less relevant to information 
users need for economic decision-making; the content of 
cross-company accounts imputation, books set confusion, 
accounting treatment was not standardized, leading to 
mismatch of financial reporting and financial activities, 
accounting information is not a true reflection of the 
company operation. China securities news, the Audit 
Commission reported on May 20, 2011 that, accounts 
in Aluminum Corporation of China is not standardized, 
so although it acquired a variety of enterprises, the 
integration situation is not satisfactory.
Third, the internal accounting control is a mere 
formality. The main internal accounting controls include 
internal accounting management system, accounting 
personnel, job responsibility system, the financial 
processing system, the internal containment system, 
audit system, quota management system, measurement 
inspection system, and property inventory system, the 
financial revenue and expenditure approval system, cost 
accounting system , financial analysis, risk early warning 
system. However, some managers’ design of approval 
authority and approval process on financial revenue and 
expenditure is unreasonable, leading to false accounting 
information; delivery of accounting documents in some 
companies is not scientific, resulting in inefficient 
accounting; Job separation in some companies is not 
clear, causing accountant misrepresent accounting 
information; some companies’ internal accounting control 
system is designed by copying others, does not apply 
to their characteristics and requirements for production 
and management; some companies’ feasibility studies on 
foreign investment is not sufficient, resulting in corporate 
decision-making mistakes, increasing risks and grim 
financial situation. “New Century Weekly” reported that 
the National Audit Office claimed in August 2010 after 
auditing: China Steel Group has financial management 
confusion and other major problems such as high-risk 
investment, huge debts. It means there are significant 
internal accounting control deficiencies in CSG, and there 
is little internal control and regulation according to the 
enterprise itself.
1.2  The Causes of Managers’ Unintentional Bad 
Accounting Behaviors 
Person’s rational behavior is limited rational behavior 
but not fully rational behavior (Simon, 1947). The 
root cause of unintentional bad accounting lies in 
managers’ limited rationality. On the one hand, various 
managers own different intelligence, ability, personality, 
temperament, attitudes, values, and different degree in 
understanding accounting theory and methods; on the 
other hand, it’s impossible for managers to fully master 
and comprehensively apply accounting knowledge, while 
accounting theory is in a dynamic developing process, 
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a variety of accounting codes of conduct and financial 
regulations constantly change with social development. 
Combining with the mentioned three manifestations, 
we analyze the reasons for managers’ unintentional bad 
accounting behaviors as following:
In the organization of accounting work, many 
factors should be considered when managers design the 
accounting organization forms. They should appraise 
company size, business conditions, related accounting 
requirements, the number and the ability of accounting 
personnel; they strive to simplify accounting procedures, 
deliver accounting information timely and correctly, 
and save human and material resources while ensure 
the quality of accounting; they should make relevant 
departments cooperate to provide consistent accounting 
data.  But there is no fixed standard to evaluate these 
factors, managers subjective judgments are necessary. 
While managers’ awareness and capacity is limited, 
the design of corporate accounting organization is not 
necessarily of scientific and rational.
As to accounting, appropriate accounting policies 
and reasonable recognition, measurement and reporting 
accounting elements require that managers should 
be familiar with the current financial regulations and 
accounting standards, has a wealth of practical experience, 
a posit ive sense of innovation, keen vision and 
adequate professional ability to judge. For the existence 
of bounded rationality which create  limitations in 
managers’ knowledge, ability and experience, continuous 
development of accounting theory and the relevant laws 
and regulations in addition, managers can not fully grasp 
the timely knowledge of accounting and related laws 
and regulations, it is impossible for them to put their 
knowledge into practice. Moreover, due to limited time 
and energy, relearning the accounting knowledge is 
difficult.
Speaking of internal accounting controls, managers 
do not pay attention to the internal accounting control 
system enables the production of accounting information 
process get out of control, ultimately affect the quality of 
accounting information. Since bounded rationality exists, 
there are omissions of the internal control system designed 
by managers, or corporate internal control system which is 
no longer meet the new environment has not been revised 
and improved in time, or the sound internal control system 
isn’t implemented well. All of these have a direct impact 
on the reliance of accounting information.
2.  THE MANIFESTATION AND CAUSES 
OF MANAGERS’ INTENTIONAL BAD 
ACCOUNTING BEHAVIORS IN CHINA’S 
LISTED COMPANIES
2.1  The Manifestation of Managers’ Intentional 
Bad Accounting Behaviors 
The feature of managers’ intentional bad accounting 
behaviors is the managers’ bad intent or purpose. It 
includes accounting fraud and earnings management. 
Earnings management contains accounting policy choice, 
the way of it is to disclosure companies’ earnings for 
outsider, the final object of it is accounting data, its 
concrete operation is ultimately reflected in accounting 
fraud (LIU, 2009). Following studies take accounting 
fraud as a typical case of managers’ intentional bad 
accounting behaviors. 
According to China Securities Regulatory Commission 
penalty notice, there are 41 listed companies are punished 
for untrue disclosure, incomplete or late accounting 
information from January 2008 to January 2011. Table 
1 shows specific tools and the frequency of accounting 
fraud.
Table 1
The Number of Companies and Frequency of Use on Accounting Fraud Methods
Accounting fraud methods                                                                                                      Number of companies      Frequency of use (%)
1.False revenue                                                                                                                                   13                                   10.24                                                       
In which: ① Fictitious revenue                                                                                                                         6                                  46.16
                ② Early recognition of revenue                                                                                                       2                                  15.38              
        ③ Other means leading to inflated revenue                                                                        5                                  38.46
2.False investment income                                                                                                                   5                                     3.94
In which: ① Early recognition of investment income                                                                                       3                                  60
        ② Fictitious investment income                                                                                                       2                                  40 
3.Inflated assets (excluding overestimate accounts receivable to invent revenue)                            16                                    12.6
In which: ① Fictitious bank and cash                                                                                                               5                                  31.25
        ② Fictitious fixed assets and construction in progress                                                                      4                                  25         
        ③ Fictitious other assets                                                                                                                    6                                  37.5
        ④ Capitalization of accrued expenses                                                                                         1                                    6.25
4.Virtual reduction of assets                                                                                                                 7                                      5.51
In which: ① Virtual reduction of outside investment                                                                                       3                                  42.86
        ② Virtual reduction of account receivable and other receivable                                                     2                                  28.57              
        ③ Virtual reduction of cash in the banks and inventory                                                                   2                                  28.57 
To be continued
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Continued
Accounting fraud methods                                                                                                      Number of companies      Frequency of use (%)
5.Underestimation of liability or less expenses or less provision for impairment                             19                                   14.96
In which: ① Underestimation of liability                                                                                                      10                                     52.63
        ② Less expenses or interest cost                                                                                                      5                                      26.32
        ③ Less provision for impairment                                                                                       4                         21.05
6.More expenses                                                                                                                               1                              0.79
7. Concealment, late or improper disclosure of important matters                                                    66                                    51.96
In which:① Association, related transactions and the relative ownership structure                                      33                                     50.00
         ② External security issues                                                                                                              13                                     19.70
        ③ Significant litigation matters                                                                                                        5                                       7.58
        ④ Major contract issues                                                                                                                    1                                       1.51
        ⑤ False disclosures                                                                                                                          5                                        7.58
        ⑥ Other important matters                                                                                                        9                         13.63
Total                                                                                                                                           127                           100
Note: the total number of companies (127) is bigger than the number of samples (41), as a company may adopt more than one 
fraud method. 
Tracing the reasons why these companies are 
punished, we can find various means and a huge amount 
are involved in managers’ intentional bad accounting 
behaviors.
Firstly, various means are involved in managers’ 
deliberately bad accounting behaviors. From Table 1 
we can find, 41 listed companies reached 7 categories 
127 kinds of fraud means as much, in average, every 
punished company adopts more than three kinds of 
accounting fraud method. Table 1 also indicates that 
the most important category of accounting fraud is the 
seventh one (concealment, late or improper disclosure of 
material matters), up to 66 cases, accounting for 51.96% 
of the total samples. Followed by the sixth category 
(underestimation of liabilities, less expenses or less 
Table 2
Fictitious Operating Revenue of Six Companies
Company Name                                                                                                                Fictitious operating revenue (Yuan)
Unionfriend Network                                                                                                           78,320,934.96 
Liangmianzhen                                                                                                                          106,977,969.23 
Jinli Technology (2008)                                                                                                         332,048,300.00
Beiya Industrial                                                                                                                          672,175,600.00 
Changfeng Communication                                                                                                         502,440,700.00 
Precision Alloy                                                                                                                          503,196,600.00 
Jinli Technology (2009)                                                                                                           35,000,000.00 
Total                                                                                                                                               2,230,160,104.19 
provision for impairment), 19 cases, accounting for 14.96 
percentage. 10 cases among them are underestimation of 
liabilities, accounting for 52.63% of this category. There 
are 16 cases of the third category (inflated assets) and 13 
cases of the forth category (false revenue), respectively 
accounting for 12.60% and 10.24% of the total samples. 
These accounting fraud methods seriously distort the 
company’s assets, liabilities and profits.
Secondly, a huge amount of money is involved in 
managers’ intentional bad accounting behaviors of listed 
companies. For example: six companies cumulatively 
fabricate ￥2.23 billion operating revenue. Of which 
Jinli Technology has reported fictitious revenues for two 
times and has been punished twice by SEC. Specific 
circumstances is shown in Table 2. 
Another example: five companies’ fictitious bank and cash add up to ￥4.093 billion. They are Dandong Chemical 
Fibre (DCF), Jiugui Liquor(JL), Jiufa Edible Fungus(JEF), WaiGaoQiao(WGQ), and Petroleum Long Champ(PLC). 
Figure 1 shows the details.
                                                                       Ten thousand Yuan
78,440.42
146,824.87
122,390.11
43,500.56
18,131.70
0.00
50,000.00
100,000.00
150,000.00
x 10000
DCF JL JEF WGQ PLC
Amount
Ten t and Yuan
Figure 1
Fictitious Bank and Cash of Five Companies
ount
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The distorted accounting information generated 
by accounting fraud makes serious consequences: on 
one hand, it may result in financial virtual income, the 
excessive distribution of national income, inflation of 
consumption, distortion of economic facts, covering 
up some contradictions in the economy, and make 
the country’s macro-supervision and regulation lose 
foundation, leading to significant financial, economic 
decision-making mistakes; on the other hand, creditors 
and investors may be led to poor decisions, their interests 
may be bruised, and reduce the efficiency of allocating 
resources in capital markets. 
2.2  The Causes of Managers’ Intentional Bad 
Accounting Behaviors
Overall, as the agent of listed companies managers’ 
objective function is inconsistent with shareholders’ 
who is the principal, the relation between managers and 
stakeholders is also complex. Because managers get 
far more and earlier corporate information than other 
accounting information users, and the outsiders such as 
the shareholders, creditors weakly supervise the insiders 
-the managers which allows managers to actually control 
the enterprise, when conflict between various parts 
interests happen, the managers have the opportunity and 
the ability to engage accounting fraud so as to achieve 
their own interests (WANG, 2011). Specific analysis on 
the reasons for managers accounting fraud is as following:
2.2.1  Corporate Governance is Defective
Corporate governance is an institutional arrangement of 
contractual relationship between principal and agent and 
to ensure the client’s interests will not be split and abuse. 
Corporate governance weaknesses provide an incentive 
and opportunity for managers’ bad accounting behaviors. 
First, management incentive and restraint mechanisms 
are asymmetry (ZHOU, 2007).  As an incent ive 
mechanism to improve corporate governance, managerial 
ownership allows managers to share the company’s 
growth and gain personal benefits. But it also requires 
managers to hold the stocks in office term and sell them 
six months later after leaving office, becomes a constraint 
mechanism against management short-term behaviors 
like a "golden handcuffs", Simultaneously, managers 
are facing much pressure such as: getting listed status, 
increasing the issue price, allotment, refinancing, keeping 
the listed qualification, removing ST title, withdrawing 
from the market, manipulating performance with the stock 
price, avoiding violations of the disclosure or shareholder 
manipulation,  obtaining bank money or commercial credit 
(YANG, HE, 2009).Comparing to the limited incentives, 
these strong constraints force managers to take risks more 
easily.
Secondly, the director structure is not reasonable, 
the work time of independent directors in corporate 
governance is not enough. Increasing the proportion 
of independent directors in the board of directors will 
bring better supervision on management behavior. 
Beasley (1996) studied U.S. companies and found that 
the proportion of outside directors could greatly reduce 
the likelihood of financial fraud. Peasnell, Pope and 
Young (2000) tested the relationship between earnings 
management and the proportion of independent directors 
in British companies, and found that the possibility 
managers increased the normal income items to avoid a 
loss or decline in earnings was negatively correlated with 
the proportion of independent directors. Now, insider 
directors are the majority of China’s listed company’s 
board of directors. There are still some companies whose 
proportion of independent directors reaches just one-third 
required by the SEC. Meanwhile, independent directors’ 
working time in companies is minimal. The time that 
independent directors participate in corporate governance 
is required not less than 15 working days a year, but the 
Center for Corporate Governance of  Nankai University 
data shows from 2004 to 2007, only 27.22 % China’s 
listed companies achieve this standard. On average, the 
annual working time of independent director of China’s 
listed companies is only 8.2 days.
Finally, the independence of the Board is not high, 
two positions such as the general manager, chairman or 
vice chairman are held by one person is the significant 
corporate governance problem. Through the investigation 
on positions as chairman and the general manager in the 
41 studied companies, we get table 3.
Table 3
The Number of Companies Where Variety of Positions are Held by One Person
Positions held              Director and                       Vice Director and             Director and Vice Director         Director and General Manager
by one person    General Manager              General Manager      and General Manager         and Secretary of the Board
The Number 
of Companies             6                                          9                                       1                                              1
Table 3 shows that there are 17 companies of the 
samples in which two positions are held by one person, 
accounting for 41.46%. One person bears three positions 
occurs in two companies. The general manager is also 
the director means the general manager masters part 
powers of the Board, manages and evaluates his own, and 
becomes a true "internal controller", making the corporate 
governance constraints and incentive mechanism 
ineffective, then the managers master powers enough to 
implement a variety of bad accounting behaviors. This 
kind of corporate governance structure is not only damage 
the interests of small shareholders, it also undermines the 
Managers’ Bad Accounting Behaviors of Listed Companies in China
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interests of major shareholders. For example, in Keyuan 
Group, the general manager and chairman and vice 
chairman are on a person, and 7 kinds of accounting fraud 
methods were adopted, far exceeding the average number 
of 3. Obviously, chairman and general manager are on 
one will create chances of accounting fraud and lead to 
aggressive bad behaviors.
2.2.2  External Supervision is Weak
The weakness of China’s monitoring is an important 
reason for the proliferation of accounting fraud. Certified 
Public Accountant is the legal institute to review corporate 
financial reports. CPA becomes the first line of defense 
to regularly supervise various types of economic entity’s 
financial reports. However, the management of accounting 
firms is not complete, the whole industry is still in 
a highly competitive state of disorder. In the current 
accounting market where supply and demand are in 
serious imbalance, many accounting firms strive to reduce 
audit fees in order to embrace customers and businesses. 
Based on cost-effective principle, low audit fees make 
these firms not perform necessary auditing procedures, or 
even just have a look at the financial statements, which 
brings potential problems of false financial reports. 
Some accounting firm still issued a qualified audit 
report knowing that is a false financial report since they 
should maintain the business relationship. So accounting 
information reviewed by CPA is not reliable too.
From January 2008 to January 2011, 11 accounting 
firms had not implemented necessary audit process or 
implemented irregular audit procedures, then failed to find 
the bad accounting business, or found a business with bad 
accounting practices but hadn’t handled it according to 
regulations, leading to administrative penalties by China 
Securities Regulatory Commission for false statement. 10 
accounting firms in which are the audit units of 10 listed 
companies mentioned as accounting fraud samples.
Although China has formulated and improved many 
laws and regulations on responsibilities for accounting 
fraud, the punishment on the involved parties is relatively 
light. Whether accounting firms that don’t issue audit 
report according to the specified rules or managers of 
listed companies who engage accounting fraud, the 
penalties are mostly confiscated, warnings and fines. With 
such a low opportunity cost compared to the benefits 
from accounting fraud, what the managers will do 
becomes evident. More terrible is that "punishment is not 
responsible for the masses" will exacerbate the situation 
of the accounting fraud.
2.2.3  Accounting Standards have Some Shortcomings 
There is a lack of coordination even some conflict areas 
between basic accounting principles and the specific 
accounting standards, among the accounting standards 
and industry-specific accounting standards, financial rules, 
and tax system. At the meanwhile, the relevant guidelines 
and regulations lag, they are modified and improved 
only after bad behavior happened. Finally, the diversity 
and uncertainties of accounting matters and optional 
provisions on accounting policies as well as accounting 
treatment allow managers of listed companies have the 
chance to cheat. China Securities Network reported, the 
recorded time of part of the fixed assets in STQinling 
is not in accordance with its intended use state time; as 
for non-new fixed assets by purchasing, expected life 
is re-estimated without considering the time the asset is 
used and the new rate. These cause the company’s less 
depreciation about ￥4.01 million, as more profit about 
￥4.01 million in 2010.
3.  RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT 
M A N A G E R S ’ B A D  A C C O U N T I N G 
B E H AV I O R S  I N  C H I N A’ S  L I S T E D 
COMPANIES
Actually, it is not easy to distinguish unintentional 
managers’ bad accounting behaviors from intentional 
ones in practice. But managers can do this themselves. 
To awaken managers’ social awareness of consciously 
reducing bad accounting behaviors, suggestions followed 
are respectively proposed in terms of two types of 
managers’ bad accounting behaviors.
3.1  Suggest ions on Keeping away from 
Managers’ Unintentional Bad Accounting 
Behaviors 
3.1.2  Strengthen the Continuing Education on 
Management
Through a variety of job training, study tours outside the 
listed companies, further education and teaching-himself, 
we can expand the manager’s professional knowledge and 
skills, develop their good habits of thinking and behavior, 
promote them to keep up with the developments of 
accounting theory, accounting standards and accounting 
laws and regulations, attach great importance to the 
construction of basic accounting work, continuously 
improve the company’s rules and regulations, strengthen 
the accounting staff in-service training, then accounting 
standards can be gradually, steadily improved and 
accounting plays an real important role in the management 
of listed companies.
3.1.2  Perfect the System of Internal Accounting 
Controls and Strictly Implement it 
The priority to sound system of internal accounting 
controls and strict implementation of it is to make 
managers pay more attention to internal accounting 
controls, then consciously strengthen the internal audit 
system which includes these actions: setting up the internal 
audit institution led by the board of supervisors and audit 
the daily operations of accounting, guaranteeing a high 
degree of independence of supervisory staff; ensuring 
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separation of incompatible duties, such as: authorization 
to execute a particular transaction and executing duties; 
performing duties on certain business and auditing duties 
to these; performing a particular transaction and recording 
the business; custody of certain property, materials and 
recording them; custody of certain property, materials 
and checking duties; general ledger and subsidiary ledger 
duties; journalizing and general ledger duties, etc.
3.2  Precautionary Measures to Managers’ 
Intentional Bad Accounting Behaviors 
3.2.1  Improve Corporate Governance
The quality of accounting information relies on the 
corporate governance, it is the result of struggle among 
relative parties of corporate governance. Balancing the 
strength of variety parties can effectively prevent the 
managers’ bad accounting behaviors and truly improve 
the quality of accounting information (XU, 2011). 
Dargenidou, McLeay and Raonic (2007) considered that 
more stringent corporate governance practices can help 
investors overcome the weaknesses of the legal protection 
terms in Europe. 
First of all, the managerial ownership should be 
properly handled and appropriate management incentives 
should be established to avoid short-term behavior of 
managers. Secondly, the structure of the board members 
and the independence of the Board must be improved so 
as to effectively bind the managers’ financial reporting 
fraud. So, we should not only increase the proportion 
of independent directors in the Board and continue to 
improve the independent director system, but also prevent 
the chairman or vice chairman and general manager duties 
on one person. To effectively perform the independent 
director system, we can start from three aspects: First, 
chose independent directors from external institutional 
investors, conforming to formal independence and 
substantial independence. Secondly, provide independent 
directors with remuneration commensurate with 
monitoring responsibilities, in order to mobilize their 
enthusiasm and sense of responsibility. Third, clearly 
define the powers and duties of independent directors as 
well as negligence penalties to ensure the independent 
directors have full motive power and pressure to supervise 
the company.
As to “Dandong Chemical Fiber”, the proportion of 
independent directors was 33.33% from 2003 to 2005, it is 
25% in 2006 and increased to 42.86% in 2007. According 
to China Securities Regulatory Commission administrative 
penalty notice, Dandong Chemical Fiber were involved in 
violations of accounting information disclosure from 2003 
to 2006 but were not in 2007, indicating a high proportion 
of independent directors of listed companies had some 
restraining effect on executives accounting fraud. 
3.2.2  Strengthen the External Oversight 
We should improve the social supervision system and 
steady the comprehensive and authoritative supervision 
of accounting. First, inspect companies’ accounting 
practices relying on social forces as CPA and strengthen 
the supervision of certified public accountants as well 
as accounting firms, promoting them to increase ethical 
standards and professional quality. Clear the legal liability 
of CPA to review and verify accounting information, 
develop and strictly enforce specific penalties for 
irresponsible or unethical CPAs to increase the cost of 
financial fraud (LIU, CHEN, ZHENG, 2010). Secondly, 
the China securities Regulatory Commission should 
carry out greater scrutiny, while mobilize tax authorities, 
financial sector, the public and other intermediaries to 
monitor the accounting practices of listed companies. 
Finally, the aforementioned means of accounting fraud in 
table 1 can be divided into three types: income statement 
fraud, the balance sheet fraud, concealment or improper 
and late disclosure of significant issues (LI Si-long, 2008). 
Therefore, the internal audit department, accounting firms, 
regulatory authorities and other relevant agencies can 
focus on items listed in Table 1 from corporate income 
statement, balance sheet and the notes as censoring and 
inspecting accounting information of list companies 
3.2.3  Mature the Accounting Regulations System  
On one hand, we should build a scientific, rigorous, 
coordinated and uniform system of accounting regulations 
after overall planning the system and content of different 
accounting laws or rules, on the other hand, we should 
complement and revise the accounting standard in time to 
avoid leaving vacuum for the innovation business so that 
minimize the manipulation opportunity by accounting 
policy choice. At the same time, we need to improve the 
feedback process of accounting standards. For accounting 
regulations have been promulgated, the implementation 
effect and problems reflected should be investigated. 
In particular, the views and suggestions fed back from 
accounting practitioners should be closely concerned, 
which enable accounting regulations to be timely revised 
and improved and accommodate themselves to developed 
economy.
3.2.4  Promote the Healthy Development of Financial 
Markets 
As the advanced form of modern enterprises, listed 
companies are essentially different from private 
companies, which are closely related with the financial 
markets, especially the stock markets. Financial markets 
are important channels for listed companies and investors 
and also the occasion of optimal allocation of resources in 
society as a whole.
Darrough and Stoughton (1990) analyzed incentives of 
voluntary disclosure and found that corporate disclosure 
of proprietary information would help financial markets 
to more accurately assess the enterprise although provided 
information to potential competitors at the same time. 
Fernandes and Guedes (2010) found that companies 
fraudulently announced revenue was positively related 
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to expected economic performance, but was negatively 
correlated to economic performance realized. These 
studies show that healthy, well-established financial 
markets can truly reflect the past of listed companies 
and can reasonably predict the future of them. When the 
financial markets valuation mechanism is perfect day 
by day and investors gradually rise their overall quality, 
phenomenon that deceived by false information will be 
greatly reduced, managers deliberately bad accounting 
will lose opportunities to gain profits, thereby reducing 
the illegal motivation; simultaneously, the resources 
configuration function of financial markets can also force 
the listed companies with apparent problems to rectify 
as soon as possible to avoid suspension or delisting, so 
managers unintentional bad accounting practices can be 
corrected.
CONCLUSION 
This paper breaks the routine that managers’ bad 
accounting behaviors just means accounting fraud, divides 
managers’ bad accounting behaviors into intentional bad 
accounting behaviors and unintentional ones. Then, it 
discusses respectively the manifestation and the causes 
of the both. It concludes that the managers’ unintentional 
bad accounting behaviors of listed companies in China 
mainly reflect in less rigorous accounting basis, non-
standardized accounting process, formalized internal 
accounting controls and other aspects. The fundamental 
reason is that managers are of limited rationality. 
Managers’ unintentional bad accounting behavior is an 
objective reality and can not be completely avoided, but 
it would be reduced through sound continuing education 
on managers and improvement of the company’s internal 
accounting system. As a typical of managers’ intentionally 
bad accounting behaviors, accounting fraud includes 
such seven categories as false revenue, false investment 
income, inflated assets and concealment of important 
matters and so on. The causes of them contain defective 
corporate governance, weak external supervision, 
immature accounting regulations. We can improve 
corporate governance, strengthen the external oversight, 
mature the accounting system of norms and promote 
healthy development of financial markets and other 
measures to prevent accounting fraud. This paper argues 
that: in practice, it’s not easy to distinguish managers’ 
intentional bad accounting behaviors from unintentional 
ones, but the managers can do. Therefore, the above 
suggestions are able to play a role.
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